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The growth of telecommunications and electronic commerce has led to a growing 
commercial market for digital encryption technologies. Business needs encryption to 
protect intellectual property and to establish secure links with their partners, 
suppliers, and customers. Banks need it to ensure the confidentiality and authenticity 
of financial transactions. Law enforcement needs it to stop those under investigation 
from intercepting police communications and obstructing investigations. Individuals 
need it to protect their private communications and confidential data. Encryption is 
critical to building a secure and trusted global information infrastructure for 
communications and electronic commerce. 
 
 Encryption also gives criminals and terrorists a powerful tool for concealing 
their activities. It can make it impossible for law enforcement agencies to obtain the 
evidence needed for a conviction or the intelligence vital to criminal investigations. It 
can frustrate communications intercepts, which have played a significant role in 
averting terrorist attacks and in gathering information about specific transnational 
threats, including terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime (White House 
1995). It can delay investigations and add to their cost. 
 
 The use of encryption to hide criminal activity is not new. The April 1970 issue 
of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin reports on several cases where law enforcement 
agencies had to break codes in order to obtain evidence or prevent violations of the 
law. None of the cases, however, involved electronic information or computers. 
Relatively simple substitution ciphers were used to conceal speech. 
 
 Digital computers have changed the landscape considerably. Encryption and 
other advanced technologies increasingly are used, with direct impact on law 
enforcement. If all communications and stored information in criminal cases were 
encrypted, it would be a nightmare for investigators. It would not be feasible to 
decrypt everything, even if technically possible. How would law enforcement 
agencies know where to spend limited resources?  
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 We address here the use of encryption and other information technologies to 
hide criminal activities. Numerous case studies are presented for illustration. We first 
examine encryption and the options available to law enforcement for dealing with it. 
Next we discuss a variety of other tools for concealing information: passwords, 
digital compression, steganography, remote storage, and audit disabling. Finally we 
discuss tools for hiding crimes through anonymity: anonymous remailers, anonymous 
digital cash, computer penetration and looping, cellular phone cloning, and cellular 
phone cards.  
 
ENCRYPTION IN CRIME AND TERRORISM 
 
This section describes criminal use of encryption in four domains: voice, fax, and 
data communications; electronic mail; files stored on the computers of individual 
criminals and criminal enterprises; and information posted in public places on 
computer networks. 
 
Voice, Fax, and Real-Time Data Communications 
 
Criminals can use encryption to make their real-time communications inaccessible to 
law enforcement. The effect is to deny law enforcement one of the most valuable 
tools in fighting organized crime - the court-ordered wiretap. In March 1997, the 
director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Louis J. Freeh, testified that the FBI 
was unable to assist with 5 requests for decryption assistance in communications 
intercepts in 1995 and 12 in 1996 (US Congress 1997a). Such wiretaps can be 
extremely valuable as they capture the subjects’ own words, which generally holds up 
much better in court than information acquired from informants, for example, who are 
often criminals themselves and extremely unreliable. Wiretaps also provide valuable 
information regarding the intentions, plans, and members of criminal conspiracies, 
and in providing leads in criminal investigations. Drug cartels and organizations rely 
heavily on communications networks; monitoring of these networks has been critical 
for identifying those at the executive level and the organizations’ illegal proceeds. 
Communications intercepts have also been useful in terrorism cases, sometimes 
helping to avoid a deadly attack. They have helped prevent the bombing of a foreign 
consulate in the United States and a rocket attempt against a U.S. ally, among other 
things (ibid). 
 
 There is little case information in the public domain on the use of 
communications encryption devices by criminal enterprises. The Cali cartel is reputed 
to be using sophisticated encryption to conceal their telephone communications. 
Communications devices seized from the cartel in 1995 included radios that distort 
voices, video phones which provide visual authentication of the caller’s identity, and 
instruments for scrambling transmissions from computer modems (Grabosky and 
Smith 1997). 
 
 We understand that some terrorist groups are using high-frequency encrypted 
voice/data links with state sponsors of terrorism. Hamas reportedly is using encrypted 
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Internet communications to transmit maps, pictures, and other details pertaining to 
terrorist attacks. The Israeli General Security Service believes that most of the data is 
being sent to the Hamas worldwide center in Great Britain (IINS 1997). 
 
 The lack of universal interoperability and cost of telephone encryption devices - 
several hundred dollars for a device that provides strong security - has likely slowed  
their adoption by criminal enterprises. The problems to law enforcement could get 
worse as prices drop and Internet telephony becomes more common. Criminals can 
conduct encrypted voice conversations over the Internet at little or no cost. This 
impact on law enforcement, however, may be balanced by the emergence of digital 
cellular communications. These phones encrypt the radio links between the mobile 
devices and base stations, which is where the communications are most vulnerable to 
eavesdroppers. Elsewhere, the communications travel in the clear (or are separately 
encrypted while traversing microwave or satellite links), making court-ordered 
interception possible in the switches. The advantage to users is that they can protect 
their local over-the-air communications even if the parties they are conversing with 
are using phones with no encryption or with incompatible methods of encryption. The 
benefit to law enforcement is that plaintext can be intercepted in the base stations or 
switches. Although there are devices for achieving end-to-end encryption with 
cellular phones, they are more costly and require compatible devices at both ends. 
 
 Hackers use encryption to protect their communications on Internet Relay Chat 
(IRC) channels from interception. They have also installed their own encryption 
software on computers they have penetrated. The software is then used to set up a 
secure channel between the hacker’s PC and the compromised machine. This has 




Law enforcement agencies have encountered encrypted e-mail and files in 
investigations of pedophiles and child pornography, including the FBI’s Innocent 
Images national child pornography investigation. In many cases, the subjects were 
using Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) to encrypt files and e-mail. PGP uses conventional 
cryptography for data encryption and public-key cryptography for key distribution. 
The investigators thought this group favored PGP because they are generally 
educated, technically knowledgeable, and heavy Internet users. PGP is universally 
available on the Internet, and they can download it for free. Investigators say, 
however, that most child pornography traded on the Internet is not encrypted. 
 
 One hacker used encrypted e-mail to facilitate the sale of credit card numbers he 
had stolen from an Internet service provider and two other companies doing business 
on the Web. According to Richard Power, editorial director of the Computer Security 
Institute, Carlos Felipe Salgado Jr. had acquired nearly 100,000 card numbers by 
penetrating the computers from an account he had compromised at the University of 
California at San Francisco. Using commonly available hacking tools, he exploited 
known security flaws in order to go around firewalls and bypass encryption and other 
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security measures. Boasting about his exploits on Internet Relay Chat, Salgado, who 
used the code name SMAK, made the mistake of offering to sell his booty to someone 
on the Internet. He conducted on-line negotiations using encrypted e-mail and 
received initial payments via anonymous Western Union wire transfer. Unknown to 
him, he had walked right into an FBI sting. After making two small buys and 
checking the legitimacy of the card numbers, FBI agents arranged a meeting at San 
Francisco airport. Salgado was to turn over the credit cards in exchange for $260,000. 
He arrived with an encrypted CD-ROM containing about 100,000 credit card 
numbers and a paperback copy of Mario Puzo’s The Last Don. The key to decrypting 
the data was given by the first letter of each sentence in the first paragraph on page 
128. Salgado was arrested and waived his rights. In June 1997, he was indicted on 
three counts of computer crime fraud and two counts of trafficking in stolen credit 
cards. In August, he pled guilty to four of the five counts. Had he not been caught, the 
losses to the credit card companies could have run from $10 million to over $100 
million (Power 1997). 
 
 We were told of another case in which a terrorist group that was attacking 
businesses and state officials used encryption to conceal their messages. At the time 
the authorities intercepted the communications, they were unable to decrypt the 
messages, although they did perform some traffic analysis to determine who was 
talking with whom. Later they found the key on the hard disk of a seized computer, 
but only after breaking through additional layers of encryption, compression, and 
password protection. The messages were said to have been a great help to the 
investigating task force. We also received an anonymous report of a group of 




In many criminal cases, documents and other papers found at a subject’s premises 
provide evidence crucial for successful prosecution. Increasingly, this information is 
stored electronically on computers. Computers themselves have posed major 
challenges to law enforcement, and encryption has only compounded these 
challenges. 
 
 The FBI found encrypted files on the laptop computer of Ramsey Yousef, a 
member of the international terrorist group responsible for bombing the World Trade 
Center in 1993 and a Manila Air airliner in late 1995. These files, which were 
successfully decrypted, contained information pertaining to further plans to blow up 
eleven U.S.-owned commercial airliners in the Far East (US Congress 1997a). 
Although much of the information was also available in unencrypted documents, the 
case illustrates the potential threat of encryption to public safety if authorities cannot 
get information about a planned attack and some of the conspirators are still at large. 
 
 Successful decryption of electronic records can be important to an investigation. 
Such was the case when Japanese authorities seized the computers of the Aum 
Shinrikyo cult - the group responsible for gassing the Tokyo subway in March 1995, 
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killing 12 people and injuring 6,000 more (Kaplan and Marshall 1996). The cult had 
stored their records on computers, encrypted with RSA. Authorities were able to 
decrypt the files after finding the key on a floppy disk. The encrypted files contained 
evidence that was said to be crucial to the investigation, including plans and 
intentions to deploy weapons of mass destruction in Japan and the United States. 
 
 In the Aum cult case, the authorities were lucky to find the key on a disk. In 
other cases, the subjects turned over their keys. For example, the Dallas Police 
Department encountered encrypted data in the investigation of a national drug ring 
which was operating in several states and dealing in Ecstasy. A member of the ring, 
residing within their jurisdiction, had encrypted his address book. He turned over the 
password, enabling the police to decrypt the file. Meanwhile, however, the subject 
was out on bond and alerted his associates, so the decrypted information was not as 
useful as it might have been. The detective handling the case said that in the ten years 
he had been working drug cases, this was the only time he had encountered 
encryption, and that he rarely even encountered computers. He noted that the Ecstasy 
dealers were into computers more than other types of drug dealers, most likely 
because they are younger and better educated. They were using the Internet for sales, 
but they were not encrypting electronic mail. The detective also noted that the big 
drug dealers were not encrypting phone calls. Instead, they were swapping phones 
(using cloned phones - see later discussion) to stay ahead of law enforcement 
(Manning 1997).2  
 
 In many cases, investigators have had to break the encryption system in order to 
get at the data. For example, when the FBI seized the computers of CIA spy Aldrich 
Ames, they found encrypted computer files, but no keys. Fortunately, Ames had used  
standard commercial off-the-shelf software, and the investigator handling the 
computer evidence was able to break the codes using software supplied by 
AccessData Corporation of Orem, Utah. The key was Ames’s Russian code name, 
KOLOKOL (bell). According to investigators, failure to recover the encrypted data 
would have weakened the case. Ames was eventually convicted of espionage against 
the United States (CSI 1997).3
 
 Code breaking is not always so easy. In his book about convicted hacker Kevin 
Poulsen, Jonathan Littman reported that Poulsen had encrypted files documenting 
everything from the wiretaps he had discovered to the dossiers he had compiled about 
his enemies. The files were said to have been encrypted several times using the 
‘Defense Encryption Standard’ [sic]. According to Littman, a Department of Energy 
supercomputer was used to find the key, a task that took several months at an 
estimated cost of hundreds of thousands of dollars. The effort apparently paid off, 
however, yielding nearly ten thousand pages of evidence (Littman 1997). 
 
 A substantial effort was also required to break the encryption software used by 
the New York subway bomber, Leary. In that case, the result yielded child 
pornography and personal information, which was not particularly useful to the case. 
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Investigators, however, retrieved other evidence from the computer that was used at 
the trial. Leary was found guilty and sentenced to 94 years in jail. 
 
 Timeliness is critical in some investigations. Several years ago, a Bolivian 
terrorist organization assassinated four U.S. Marines, and AccessData was brought in 
to decrypt files seized from a safe house. With only twenty four hours to perform this 
task, they decrypted the custom-encrypted files in twelve, and the case ended with 
one of the largest drug busts in Bolivian history. The terrorists were caught and put in 
jail (CSA 1997). In such cases, an effort that requires months or years to complete 
might be useless. 
 
 In other cases, the ability to successfully decrypt files proved unessential, as 
when a Durham priest was sentenced to six years in jail for sexually assaulting 
minors and distributing child pornography (Akdeniz). The priest was part of an 
international pedophile ring that communicated and exchanged images over the 
Internet. When U.K. authorities seized his computers, they found files of encrypted 
messages. The encryption was successfully broken, however, the decrypted data did 
not affect the case. 
 
 Even when decrypted material has little or no investigative value, considerable 
resources are wasted reaching that determination. If all information were encrypted, it 
would be extremely difficult for law enforcement to decide where to spend precious 
resources. It would not be practical or even possible to decrypt everything. Yet if 
nothing were decrypted, many criminals would go free. 
 
 Some investigations have been derailed by encryption. For example, at one 
university, the investigation of a professor thought to be trafficking in child 
pornography was aborted because the campus police could not decrypt his files. In 
another case, an employee of a company copied proprietary software to a floppy disk, 
took the disk home, and then stored the file on his computer encrypted under PGP. 
Evidently, his intention was to use the software to offer competing services, which 
were valued at tens of millions of dollars annually (the software itself cost over a 
million dollars to develop). At the time we heard about the case, the authorities had 
not determined the passphrase needed to decrypt the files. Information contained in 
logs had led them to suspect the file was the pilfered software. 
 
 At Senate hearings in September 1997, Jeffery Herig, special agent with the 
Florida Department of Law Enforcement, testified that they were unable to access 
protected files within a personal finance program in an embezzlement case at Florida 
State University. He said the files could possibly hold useful information concerning 
the location of the embezzled funds (US Congress 1997b). 
 
 Herig also reported that they had encountered unbreakable encryption in a U.S. 
Customs case involving an illegal, world-wide advanced fee scheme. At least 300 
victims were allegedly bilked out of over $60 million. Herig said they had 
encountered three different encryption systems. Although they were able to defeat the 
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first two, they were unsuccessful with the third. The vendor told them that there no 
backdoors. “Although I have been able to access some of the encrypted data in this 
case,” Herig said, “we know there is a substantial amount of incriminating evidence 
which has not been recovered” (ibid). 
 
 In early 1997, we were told that Dutch organized crime had received encryption 
support from a group of skilled hackers who themselves used PGP and PGPfone to 
encrypt their communications. The hackers had supplied the mobsters with palmtop 
computers on which they installed Secure Device, a Dutch software product for 
encrypting data with IDEA. The palmtops served as an unmarked police/intelligence 
vehicles database. In 1995, the Amsterdam Police captured a PC in the possession of 
one organized crime member. The PC contained an encrypted partition, which they 
were unable to recover at the time. Nevertheless, there was sufficient other evidence 
for conviction. The disk, which was encrypted with a U.S. product, was eventually 
decrypted in 1997 and found to be of little interest. 
 
 There have been a few reported cases of company insiders using encryption as a 
tool of extortion. The employees or former employees threatened to withhold the keys 
to encrypted data unless payment was made. In these cases, encryption is not used to 
conceal evidence of crimes, but rather to intimidate the organization. We are not 
aware of any extortion attempts of this nature that succeeded. 
 
 The use of encryption by the victims of crime can also pose a problem for law 
enforcement. At hearings in June 1997, Senator Charles Grassley told of an 11-year-
old boy in the Denver area who committed suicide after being sexually molested. The 
boy had left behind a personal organizer, which investigators believed might contain 
information about the man whom his mother believed molested him. The organizer 
was encrypted, however, and the police had been unable to crack the password. The 
investigation had been on hold since February 1996. 
 
 In April 1998, the FBI’s Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) forensics 
laboratory started collecting data on computer forensics cases handled at headquarters 
or in one of the FBI’s field offices. As of December 9, they had received 299 
examination reporting forms, of which 12 (4%) indicated use of encryption.4 This is 
slightly lower than CART’s estimate of 5-6% for 1996 (Denning and Baugh 1997). 
There are at least three possible explanations. One is that the 1996 estimate, which 
was made before the FBI began collecting hard data, was somewhat high. A second is 
that as computers have become more common and user friendly, they are increasingly 
being used by criminals who lack the knowledge or skills to encrypt their files. 
Hence, the percentage of computer forensics cases involving encryption is staying 
about the same or decreasing even as the total number of forensics cases (and 
encryption cases) is growing. A third is that the early reports are skewed; as more 





Criminals can use encryption to communicate in secrecy through open forum such as 
computer bulletin boards and Internet Web sites.  Although many people might see 
the garbled messages, only those with the key would be able to determine the 
plaintext. 
 
 This technique was used by an extortionist who threatened to kill Microsoft 
president and chief executive officer Bill Gates in spring 1997.5 The extortionist 
transmitted his messages to Gates via letter, but then asked Gates to acknowledge 
acceptance by posting a specified message on the America Online Netgirl bulletin 
board. Gates then received a letter with instructions to open an account for a Mr. 
Robert M. Rath in a Luxemburg bank and to transfer $5,246,827.62 to that account. 
The money was to be transferred by April 26 in order “to avoid dying, among other 
things.” Gates was reminded that April 26 was his daughter’s birthday. The letter 
came with a disk, which contained an image of Elvira and the key to a simple 
substitution cipher. Gates was told to use the code to encrypt instructions for 
accessing the Rath account via telephone or facsimile. He was then to attach the 
ciphertext to the bottom of the image and post the image to numerous image libraries 
within the Photography Forum of America Online (AOL). The graphic image with 
ciphertext was uploaded to AOL at the direction of the FBI on April 25. Figure 1 
shows the image as posted and translation code. 
 
 Although Gates complied with the requests, he did not lose his money. The 
extortion threat was traced to Adam Quinn Pletcher in Long Grove, Illinois. On May 
9, Pletcher admitted writing and mailing the threatening letters (there were four 
altogether) to Gates. 
 
LAW ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS 
 
The majority of investigations we heard about were not stopped by encryption. 
Authorities obtained the key by consent, found it on disk, or cracked the system in 
some way, for example, by guessing a password or exploiting a weakness in the 
overall system. Alternatively, they used other evidence such as printed copies of 
encrypted documents, other paper documents, unencrypted conversations and files, 
witnesses, and information acquired through other, more intrusive, surveillance 
technologies such as bugs. We emphasize, however, that these were cases involving 
computer searches and seizures, not wiretaps. This section discusses the options 
available to law enforcement for dealing with encryption. 
 
 
Getting Key From Subject 
 
In many cases, subjects have cooperated with the police and disclosed their keys or 
passwords, sometimes as part of a plea bargain. One hacker who had encrypted his 
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He (Erik) wanted to speed the process along. The decrypted files contained evidence 
that was important to the case.6   
 
 A question that frequently arises is whether a court can compel the disclosure of 
plaintext or keys, or whether the defendants are protected by the 5th Amendment. 
Philip Reitinger, an attorney with the Department of Justice Computer Crime Unit, 
studied this question and concluded that a grand jury subpoena can direct the 
production of plaintext or of documents that reveal keys, although a limited form of 
immunity may be required (Reitinger 1996). He left open the question of whether law 
enforcement could compel production of a key that has been memorized but not 
recorded. He also observed that faced with the choice of providing a key that unlocks 
incriminating evidence or risking contempt of court, many will choose the latter and 
claim loss of memory or destruction of the key. 
 
 In People v. Price in Yolo County, California Superior Court prosecutors 
successfully compelled production of the passphrase protecting the defendant’s PGP 
key. In this case, however, the key was not sought for the purpose of acquiring 
evidence for conviction, but rather to determine whether the defendant’s computer 
should be released from police custody. He had already been convicted of annoying 
children and wanted his computer back. The police argued it should not be released 
as  
there was reason to believe it contained contraband, specifically PGP-encrypted files 
containing child pornography. This determination was based on the existence of a 
pair of files named “Boys.gif” and “Boys.pgp” (when PGP encrypts a plaintext file, it 
automatically gives the ciphertext file the same name but with the extension “.pgp”).7
 
 The defendant was unsuccessful in arguing a 5th Amendment privilege. The 
prosecution argued that the contents of the file had already been uttered and, 
therefore, were not protected under the 5th Amendment. As long as prosecutors did 
not try to tie the defendant to the file by virtue of his knowing the passphrase, no 
incrimination was implied by disclosing the passphrase. 
 
 To handle the passphrase, a court clerk was sworn in as a special master. An 
investigator activated the PGP program to the point where it prompted for the 
passphrase. He left the room while the defendant disclosed the passphrase to the 
special master, who typed it into the computer. The investigator was then brought 
back into the room to hit the Enter key and complete the decryption process. As 
expected, child pornography fell out. The judge then ordered the computer, its 
peripherals, and all diskettes destroyed. The defendant argued that the computer 
contained research material, but the judge admonished him for commingling it with 
the contraband. 
 
Getting Access Through a Third Party 
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Some encryption products have a key recovery system which enables access to 
plaintext through a means other than the normal decryption process. The key needed 
to decrypt the data is recovered using information stored with the ciphertext plus 
information held by a trusted agent, which could be an officer of the organization 
owning the data or a third party. The primary objective is to protect organizations and 
individuals using strong encryption from loss or destruction of encryption keys, 
which could render valuable data inaccessible. 
 
 Key recovery systems can accommodate lawful investigations by proving 
authorities with a means of acquiring the keys needed. If the keys are held by a third 
party, this can be done without the knowledge of the criminal group under 
investigation. Of course, if criminal enterprises operate their own recovery services, 
law enforcement may be no better off. Indeed, they could be worse off because the 
encryption will be much stronger, possibly uncrackable, and the criminals might not 
cooperate with the authorities. Moreover, with wiretaps, which must be performed 
surreptitiously to have value, investigators cannot go to the subjects and ask for keys 
to tap their lines. Key recovery systems could also encourage the use of encryption in 
organized crime to protect electronic files, as criminal enterprises need not worry 
about loss of keys. 
 
 Because of the potential benefits of key recovery to law enforcement, the 
Clinton Administration has encouraged the development of key recovery products by 
offering an export advantages to companies making such products. Beginning in 
December 1996, products with key recovery systems could be readily exported with 
unlimited key lengths. The Administration has retained restrictions on non-
recoverable products that use keys longer than 56 bits, but even here export controls 
have been liberalized to allow ready export under certain conditions. 
 
Breaking the Codes 
 
It is often possible to obtain the key needed to decrypt data by exploiting a weakness 
in the encryption algorithm, implementation, key management system, or some other 
system component. Indeed, there are software tools on the Internet for cracking the 
encryption in many commercial applications.  One site on the World Wide Web lists 
freeware crackers and products from AccessData Corp. and CRAK Software for 
Microsoft Word, Excel, and Money; WordPerfect, Data Perfect, and Professional 
Write; Lotus 1-2-3 and Quattro Pro; Paradox; PKZIP; Symantex Q&A, and Quicken.8
 
 Eric Thompson, president of AccessData, reported that they had a recovery rate 
of 80-85 per cent with the encryption in large-scale commercial commodity software 
applications. He also noted that 90 per cent of the systems are broken somewhere 
other than at the crypto engine level, for example, in the way the text is pre-processed 
(CSI 1997). A passphrase or key might be found in the swap space on disk. 
 
 In those cases where there is no shortcut attack, the key might be determined by 
brute force search, that is, by trying all possible keys until one is found that yields 
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known plaintext or, if that is not available, meaningful data. Keys are represented as 
strings of 0s and 1s (bits), so this means trying every possible bit combination. This is 
relatively easy if the keys are no more than 40 bits, and somewhat longer keys can be  
broken given enough horsepower.  In July 1998, John Gilmore, a computer privacy 
and civil liberties activist, and Paul Kocher, president of Cryptography Research in 
California, won $10,000 for designing a supercomputer that broke a 56-bit DES 
challenge cipher in record time, in their case 56 hours or less than three days. The 
EFF DES Cracker was built by a team of about a dozen computer researchers with 
funds from the Electronic Frontier Foundation. It took less than a year to build and 
cost less than $250,000. It tested keys at a rate of almost 100 billion per second (EFF 
1998; Markoff 1998). 
 
 Unfortunately, criminals can protect against such searches by using methods 
that take longer keys, say 128 bits with the RC4, RC5, or IDEA encryption algorithm 
or 168 bits with Triple DES. Because each additional bit doubles the number of 
candidates to try, a brute force search quickly becomes intractable. To crack a 64-bit 
key, it would take 10 EFF DES Crackers operating for an entire year. At 128 bits, it is 
totally infeasible to break a key by brute force, even if all the computers in the world 
are put to the task. To break one in a year would require, say, 1 trillion computers 
(more than 100 computers for every person on the globe), each running 10 billion 
times faster than the EFF DES Cracker. Put another way, it would require the 
equivalent of 10 billion trillion DES Crackers! Many products, including PGP, use 
128-bit keys or longer. 
 
 With many encryption systems, for example PGP, a user’s private key (which 
unlocks message keys) is computed from or protected by a passphrase chosen by the  
user. In that case, it may be easier to brute force the password than the key because it 
will be limited to ASCII characters and be less random than an arbitrary stream of 
bits. Eric Thompson reports that the odds are about even of successfully guessing a 
password. They use a variety of techniques including Markov chains, phonetic 
generation algorithms, and concatenation of small words (CIS 1997). 
 
 Often, investigators will find multiple encryption systems on a subject’s 
computer.  For example, PGP might be used for e-mail, while an application’s built-
in encryption might be used to protect documents within the application. In those 
cases, the subject might use the same password with all systems. If investigators can 
break one because the overall system is weak, they might be able to break the other, 
more difficult system by trying the same password. 
 
 To help law enforcement develop the capability to stay abreast of new 
technologies, including encryption, the Federal Bureau of Investigation proposes to 
establish a technical support center. The center would maintain a close working 
relationship with the encryption vendors. The Clinton Administration announced 




 One issue raised by the development and use of tools for breaking codes is how 
law enforcement can protect its sources and methods. If investigators must reveal in 
court the exact methods used to decipher a message, future use of such methods could 
be jeopardized. 
 
Finding an Access Point 
 
Another strategy for acquiring plaintext is to find an access point that provides direct 
access to the plaintext before encryption or after decryption. In the area of 
communications, a router or switch might offer such access to communications that 
traverse the switch. If the communications are encrypted on links coming into and 
going out of the switch, but in the clear as they pass through the switch, then a 
wiretap placed in the switch will give access to the plaintext communications. We 
noted earlier how digital cellular communications could be intercepted in this 
manner, while at the same time offering users considerably greater security and 
privacy than offered by analog phones that do not use encryption. 
 
 Network encryption systems which offer access points of this nature are given 
an export advantage over those that do not (ibid). The approach was initially called a 
“private doorbell” approach to distinguish it from one that uses key recovery agents 
(Corcoran 1998; CISCO 1998).  Now it is considered a form of recoverable 
encryption. 
 
 For stored data, Codex Data Systems of Bardonia, New York, advertises a 
product called Data Interception by Remote Transmission (D.I.R.T.) which is  
designed to allow remote monitoring of a subject’s personal computer by law 
enforcement and other intelligence gathering agencies. Once D.I.R.T. is installed on 
the subject’s machine, the software will surreptitiously log keystrokes and transmit 
captured data to a pre-determined Internet address that is monitored and decoded by 
D.I.R.T. Command Center Software. D.I.R.T. add-ons include remote file access, 
real-time capture of keystrokes, remote screen capture, and remote audio and video 
capture. The software could be used to capture a password and read encrypted e-mail 
traffic and files. 
 
 
When All Else Fails 
 
The inability to break through encryption does not always spell doom. Investigators 
may find printed copies of encrypted documents. They may find the original plaintext 
version of an encrypted file, for example, if the subject forgot to delete the original 
file or if it was not thoroughly erased from the disk. They may obtain incriminating 
information from unencrypted conversations, witnesses, informants, and hidden 
microphones. They may conduct an undercover or sting operation to catch the 
subject. These other methods do not guarantee success, however. 
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 If there is sufficient evidence of some crime, but not the one believed to be 
concealed by encryption, a conviction may be possible on lesser charges. This 
happened in Maryland when police encountered an encrypted file in a drug case.  
Allegations were raised that the subject had been involved in document counterfeiting 
and file names were consistent with formal documents. Efforts to decrypt the files 
failed, however, so the conviction was on the drug charges only.9  
 
 In another case, a 15-year-old boy came to the child abuse bureau of the 
Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department with his mother, who desired to file a 
complaint against an adult who had met her son in person, befriending the boy and 
his friends and buying them pizza. The man had sold her son $500-$1000 worth of 
hardware and software for $1.00 and given him lewd pictures on floppy disks. The 
man subsequently mailed her son pornographic material on floppy disk and sent her 
son pornographic files over the Internet using America Online. After three months of 
investigation, a search warrant was issued against a man in Campbell, California and 
the adoption process of a 9-year-old boy was stopped. Eventually, the subject was 
arrested, but by this time he had purchased another computer system and traveled to 
England to visit another boy. Within ten days of acquiring the system, he had started 
experimenting with different encryption systems, eventually settling on PGP. He had 
encrypted a directory on the system. There was information indicating that the subject 
was engaged in serious corporate espionage, and it was thought that the encrypted 
files might have contained evidence of that activity. They were never able to decrypt 
the files, however, and after the subject tried unsuccessfully to put a contract out on 
the victim from jail, he pled no contest to multiple counts of distribution of harmful 
material to a juvenile and the attempt to influence, dissuade, or harm a 
victim/witness.10
 
 If encryption precludes access to all evidence of wrongdoing, then a case is 
dropped (assuming other methods of investigation have failed as well). Several cases 
that had been aborted or put on hold because of encryption were noted earlier. 
 
OTHER TECHNOLOGIES FOR HIDING EVIDENCE 
 





Criminals, like law abiding persons, often password protect their machines to keep 
others out. In one gambling operation with connections to New York’s Gambino, 
Genovese, and Colombo crime families, bookies had password-protected a computer 
used to cover bets at the rate of $65 million a year (Ramo 1996). After discovering 
that the password was one of the henchmen’s mother’s name, the cops found 10,000 
digital betting slips worth $10 million. 
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 Another gambling enterprise operated multiple sites linked by a computer 
system, with drop-offs and pick-ups spanning three California counties. The ring  
leader managed his records with a commercial accounting program, using a password 
to control access to his files. Although the software manufacturer refused to assist law 
enforcement, police investigators were able to gain access by zeroing out the 
passwords in the data files. They found the daily take on bets, payoffs, persons 
involved, amounts due and paid or owed, and so forth. The printed files showed the 
results of four years of bookmaking, and resulted in a plea of guilty to the original 
charges and a sizeable payment of back taxes, both state and federal.11
 
 Passwords are encountered much more often than encryption in computer 
forensics cases. Of the 299 computer examination reports received by the FBI’s 
CART between April and December 1998, 60 (20 per cent) indicated use of 




Digital compression is normally used to reduce the size of a file or communication 
without losing information content, or at least significant content. The greatest 
reductions are normally achieved with audio, image, and video data; however, 
substantial savings are possible even with text data. Compression can benefit the 
criminal trying to hide information in two ways. First, it makes the task of identifying 
and accessing information more difficult for the police conducting a wiretap or 
seizing files. Second, when used prior to encryption, it can make cracking an 
otherwise weak cipher difficult. This is because the compressed data is more random 
in appearance than the original data, making it less susceptible to techniques that 




Steganography refers to methods of hiding secret data in other data such that its 
existence is even concealed. One class of methods encodes the secret data in the low-
order bit positions of image, sound, or video files. There are several tools for doing 
this, many of which can be downloaded for free off the Internet. With S-tools, for 
example, the user hides a file of secret data in an image by dragging the file over the 
image. The software will optionally encrypt the data before hiding it for an extra 
layer of security. S-tools will also hide data in sound files or in the unallocated 
sectors of a disk. Figure 2 shows the effect of using S-tools to hide a 17-page book 
chapter inside an image file that is less than four times the size; that is, about a 
quarter of the file contains a hidden document. The difference between the before and 
after images is barely noticeable. 
 
 There have been a few reported cases of criminals using steganography to 
facilitate their crimes. One credit card thief, for example, used it to hide stolen card 
numbers on a hacked Web page. He replaced bullets on the page with images that 
looked the same but contained the credit card numbers, which he then offered to 
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associates. This case illustrates the potential of using Web images as “digital dead 
drops” for information brokering. Only a handful of people need even know the drop 
exists. 
 
 Steganography can be used to hide the existence of files on a computer’s hard 
disk. Ross Anderson, Roger Needham, and Adi Shamir propose a steganographic file 
system that would make a file invisible to anyone who does not know the file name 
and a password. An attacker who does not know this information gains no knowledge 
about whether the file exists, even given complete access to all the hardware and 
software. One simple approach creates cover files so that the user’s hidden files are 
the exclusive or (XOR) of a subset of the cover files. The subset is chosen by the 




Criminals can hide data by storing it on remote hosts, for example, a file server at 
their Internet Service Provider (ISP). Jim McMahon, former head of the High 
Technology Crimes Detail of the San Jose Police Department, reported that he had 
personally seen suspects hiding criminal data on non-local disks, often at ISP 
locations, but sometimes on the systems of innocent third parties with poor security, 
leaving them open to intrusions and subsequent abuse. Eugene Schultz, former 
manager of the Department of Energy’s Computer Incident Advisory Capability, said 
that a group of hackers from the Netherlands had taken so much information from 
Defense Department computers that they could not store it all on their own disks. So 
they broke into systems at Bowling Green University and the University of Chicago 
and downloaded the information to these sites, figuring they could transfer it 
somewhere else later.13  Software pirates have been known to stash their pilfered files 
in hidden directories on systems they have hacked. 
 
 Data can be hidden on removable disks and kept in a physical location away 
from the computers. Don Delaney, a detective with the New York State Police, told 
us in early 1997 that in one Russian organized crime case involving more than $100 
million in state sales tax evasion, money laundering, gasoline bootlegging, and 
enterprise corruption, they had to obtain amendments to their search warrants in order 
to seize disks and records from handbags and locked briefcases in the offices at two 
locations. After an exhaustive six month review of all computer evidence, they 
determined that the largest amount of the most damaging evidence was on the 
diskettes. The crooks did their work in Excel and then saved it on floppies. The 
lesson they learned from this was to execute the search warrant with everyone present 
and look for disks in areas where personal property is kept. As storage technologies 




Most systems keep a log of activity on the system. Perpetrators of computer crimes 
have, in many cases, disabled the auditing or deleted the audit records pertaining to 
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their activity. The hacking tool RootKit, for example, contains Trojan horse system 
utilities which conceal the presence of the hacker and disable auditing. ZAP is 
another tool for erasing audit records. Both of these can be downloaded for free on 
the Internet. 
 
CONCEALING CRIMES THROUGH ANONYMITY 
 
Crimes can be concealed by hiding behind a cloak of anonymity. A variety of 




An anonymous remailer is a service that allows someone to send an electronic mail 
message without the receiver knowing the sender’s identity. The remailer may keep 
enough information about the sender to enable the receiver to reply to the message by 
way of the remailer. To illustrate, suppose Alice wishes to send an anonymous e-mail 
message to Bob. Instead of e-mailing to Bob directly, Alice sends the message to a 
remailer (an e-mail server), which strips off the headers and forwards the contents to 
Bob. When Bob gets the message, he sees that it came via the remailer, but he cannot 
tell who the sender was. Some remailers give users pseudonyms so that recipients can 
reply to messages by way of the remailer. The remailer forwards the replies to the 
owners of the pseudonyms. These pseudo anonymous remailers do not provide total 
anonymity because the remailer knows who the parties are. Other remailers offer full 
anonymity, but they cannot support replies. All they do is act as a mail forwarder. 
 
 A remailer can accumulate batches of messages before forwarding them to their 
destinations. That way, if someone is intercepting encrypted Internet messages for the 
purpose of traffic analysis, the eavesdropper would not be able to deduce who is 
talking to whom. 
 
 There are numerous anonymous and pseudo anonymous remailers on the 
Internet. Some provide encryption services (typically using PGP) in addition to mail 
forwarding so that messages transmitted to and from the remailer can be encrypted. 
Users who don’t trust the remailers can forward their messages through multiple 
remailers. 
 
 Anonymous remailers allow persons to engage in criminal activity while 
concealing their identities. President Clinton, for example, has received e-mail death 
threats that were routed through anonymous remailers. In one case involving 
remailers, an extortionist threatened to fly a model airplane into the jet engine of an 
airplane during takeoff at a German airport, the objective being to cause the plane to 
crash. The threats were sent as e-mail through an anonymous remailer in the United 
States. The messages were traced to introductory accounts on America Online, but 
the person had provided bogus names and credit card numbers. He was caught, 
however, before carrying out his threat.14
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Anonymous Digital Cash 
 
Digital cash enables users to buy and sell information goods and services. It is 
particularly useful with small transactions, serving the role of hard currency. Some 
methods allow users to make transactions with complete anonymity; others allow 
traceability under exigent circumstances, for example, a court order. 
 
 Total anonymity affords criminals the ability to launder money and engage in 
other illegal activity in ways that circumvent law enforcement. Combined with 
encryption or steganography and anonymous remailers, digital cash could be used to 
traffic in stolen intellectual property on the Web or to extort money from victims. 
 
 In May 1993, Timothy May wrote an essay about a hypothetical organization, 
BlackNet, which would buy and sell information using a combination of public-key 
cryptography, anonymous remailers, and anonymous digital cash.  
 
‘BlackNet can make anonymous deposits to the bank account of your choice, 
where local banking laws permit, can mail cash directly ..., or can credit you in 
‘CryptoCredits,’ the internal currency of BlackNet ... If you are interested, do 
not attempt to contact us directly (you’ll be wasting your time), and do not post 
anything that contains your name, your e-mail address, etc. Rather, compose 
your message, encrypt it with the public key of BlackNet (included below), and 
use an anonymous remailer chain of one or more links to post this encrypted, 
anonymized message on one of the locations listed ...” (May 1996a). 
 
Although May said he wrote the essay to point out the difficulty of “bottling up” new 
technologies (May 1996b), rumors spread shortly after May’s essay appeared on the 
Internet of actual BlackNets being used for the purpose of selling stolen trade secrets. 
 
 In an essay called ‘Assassination Politics,’ James Dalton Bell suggested using 
cyber betting pools to kill off Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents and other ‘hated 
government employees and officeholders’ (Bell 1996).15 The idea was simple: using 
the Internet, encryption, and untraceable digital cash, anyone could contribute 
anonymously to a pool of digital cash. The person, presumably the assassin, correctly 
guessing the victim’s time of death wins. After spending nearly two years peddling 
his ideas on Internet discussion groups and mailing lists, Bell was arrested and pled 
guilty to two felony charges: obstructing and impeding the IRS and falsely using a 
social security number with the intent to deceive. In his plea agreement, he admitted 
to conducting a “stink bomb” attack on an IRS office in Vancouver (McCullah 
1997).16 He also disclosed the passphrase required to decrypt e-mail messages that 
had been sent to Bell by his associates encrypted under PGP. 
 
 Although Bell did not implement any betting pools, an anonymous message was 
posted to the Cypherpunks Internet mailing list announcing an Assassination Politics 
Bot (program) called Dead Lucky that did. The message also listed four potential 
targets. A related message pointed to an interactive Web page titled Dead Lucky, 
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which contained the statement ‘If you can correctly predict the date and time of death 
of others then you can win large prizes payable in untaxable, untraceable eca$h.’ The 
page also stated ‘Contest will officially begin after Posting of Rules and 
Announcement of Official Starting Date (Until then it is for Entertainment Purposes 
Only).’ Another anonymous message posted to Cypherpunks had the subject 
‘Encrypted InterNet DEATH THREAT!!! / ATTN: Ninth District Judges / 
PASSWORD: sog.’ The PGP encrypted message, when decrypted with ‘sog,’ 
contained death threats and a claim to authorship of the Assassination Bot. 
Investigators linked the messages and Bot to an individual by the name of Carl 
Edward Johnson. In August 1998, a warrant was issued charging Johnson with 
threatening ‘to kill certain law enforcement officers and judges of the United States, 
with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with said officers and judges on account 
of their official duties.’17
 
Computer Penetrations and Looping 
 
By breaking into someone’s computer account and issuing commands from that 
account, a criminal can hide behind the account holder’s identity. In one such case, 
two hackers allegedly penetrated the computers of Strong Capital Management and 
sent out 250,000 ads with fraudulent headers that bore the company’s name. The ads 
were for on-line striptease services (‘cyber stripping’), computer equipment, and 
sports betting. SCM filed a $125 million lawsuit against the hackers, demanding 
penalties of $5,000 per message (Kabay 1997).  
 
 Hackers can make it difficult for investigators to discover their true identity by 
using a technique called looping.’ Instead of penetrating a particular system directly, 
they can enter one system and use that as a springboard to penetrate another, use the 
second system to penetrate a third, and so forth, eventually reaching their target 
system. The effect is to conceal the intruder’s location and complicate an 
investigation.  In order to trace the connection, investigators need the help of systems 
administrators along the path. If the path crosses several national borders, getting that 
cooperation may be impossible. 
 
Cellular Phones and Cloning 
 
Drug lords, gangsters, and other criminals regularly use “cloned” cell phones to evade 
the police.  Typically, they buy the phones in bulk and discard them after use. A top 
Cali cartel manager might use as many as 35 different cell phones a day (Ramo 
1996). In one case involving the Colombia cartel, DEA officials discovered an 
unusual number of calls to Colombia on their phone bills. It turned out that cartel 
operatives had cloned the DEA’s own number!  Some cloned phones, called ‘lifetime 
phones,’ hold up to 99 stolen numbers. New numbers can be programmed into the 
phone from a keypad, allowing the user to switch to a different cloned number for 
each and every call.  With cloning, whether cellular communications are encrypted 




 Digital cellular phones use stronger methods of authentication that protect 
against cloning. As this technology replaces analog cell phones, cloning may be less 
of a problem for law enforcement. 
 
Cellular Phone Cards 
 
A similar problem occurs with cellular phone cards. These pre-paid cards, which are 
inserted into a mobile phone, specify a telephone number and amount of air time. In 
Sweden, phone cards can be purchased anonymously, which has made wiretapping  
impossible. The narcotics police have asked that purchasers be required to register in 
a database that would be accessible to the police (Minow 1997). A similar card is 
used in France, however buyers must show an identification card at the time of 
purchase. In Italy, a pre-paid card must be linked to an identity, which must be linked 




Criminals and terrorists are using encryption and other advanced technologies to hide 
their activities. Indications are that use of these technologies will continue and 
expand, with a growing impact on law enforcement. Although the majority of 
investigations we heard about were not stopped by encryption, we heard about a few 
cases that were effectively derailed or put on hold by encryption. Even when the 
encryption was broken, however, it delayed investigations, sometimes by months or 
years, and added to their cost, in a few cases costing agencies hundreds of thousands 
of dollars to crack open encrypted files. 
 
 Efforts to decrypt data for law enforcement agencies or corporations in need of 
recovering from lost keys have been largely successful because of weaknesses in the 
systems as a whole. That success rate is likely to drop, however, as vendors integrate 
stronger encryption into their products and get smarter about security. It is not 
possible to break well-designed cryptosystems that use key lengths of 128 bits or 
more. It is not just a matter of paying enough money or getting enough people on the 
Internet to help out. The resources simply do not exist - anywhere. 
 
 Most of the investigators we talked to said that they had not yet detected 
substantial use of encryption by large organized crime groups. This can be attributed 
to several factors, including the difficulty and overhead of using encryption 
(particularly the personnel time involved) and a general sense that their environments 
are already reasonably isolated and protected from law enforcement.  
 
 Maria Christina Ascents, who runs the Italian state police’s crime and 
technology center, said that the Italian Mafia is increasingly looking to use encryption 
to help protect it from the government. She cited encryption as their greatest limit on 
investigations, and noted that instead of hiring cryptographers to create their codes, 
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mobsters download copies of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) off the Internet (Ramo 
1996). 
 
 As the population becomes better educated about technology and encryption, 
more and more criminals will have the knowledge and skills needed to evade law 
enforcement, particularly given the ease with which unbreakable, user-friendly 
software encryption can be distributed and obtained on the Internet. We 
recommend ongoing collection of data on the use of encryption and other advanced 
technologies in crime. We need to know how encryption is impacting cases - whether 
it is broken or circumvented, whether cases are successfully investigated and 
prosecuted despite encryption, and costs to investigators.  
 
 Encryption is a critical international issue with severe impact and benefits to 
business and order. National policy must recognize not only the threat to law 
enforcement and intelligence operations, but also the need to protect the intellectual 
property and economic competitiveness of industry. Encryption policy must also 
respect consumer needs for encryption and basic human rights, including privacy and 
freedom of expression. Addressing all of these interests is enormously challenging.  
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